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NOTE
DECONSTRUCTING "JUST AND PROPER": ARGUMENTS
IN FAVOR OF ADOPTING THE "REMEDIAL PURPOSE"
APPROACH TO SECTION 10(J) LABOR INJUNCTIONS
William K. Briggs*
Congress, through the 1947 addition of section 10(j) to the National Labor
Relations Act, authorized district courts to grant preliminary injunctive re-
lief for unfair labor practices if they deem such relief "just and proper" To
this day a circuit split persists over the correct interpretation of this "just
and proper" standard. Some circuits interpret "just and proper" to require
application of the traditional equitable principles approach that normally
governs preliminary injunctions. Other circuits interpret "just and proper"
to require an analysis of whether injunctive relief is necessary to preserve
the National Labor Relations Board's remedial power This Note examines
the justifications behind these two interpretations in light of section 10(j)'s
statutory structure-most notably, the use of the just and proper standard
in two other provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. It also consid-
ers the legislative history of section 10(j) and the public policy
consequences underlying Congress's mandate granting the Board exclu-
sive jurisdiction to seek injunctive relief in court under section 10(j). This
Note argues that an examination of these factors reveals that Congress in-
tended for courts to focus their section 10(j) analysis on the preservation
of the National Labor Relations Board's remedial power rather than on
traditional equitable principles.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 2010, the general counsel of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board ("the Board") issued a memorandum to all of its regional
offices. This memorandum announced an initiative to expedite the pro-
cessing of section 10(j) requests for interim injunctive relief in cases
involving unlawful discharges during union organizing campaigns.1 Section
10(j) is a provision in the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") that au-
thorizes the Board to seek a preliminary injunction in federal court on behalf
of a private party who has filed a complaint of an unfair labor practice with
the Board.' In addition to unlawful discharges, unfair labor practices gov-
erned by section 10(j) include interfering with an organizational campaign,
undermining a bargaining representative, refusing to permit protected activi-
ty, and refusing to bargain in good faith.3 Although the Board possesses the
jurisdiction to rule on the merits of these unfair labor practices, an injunc-
tion is often necessary because of the length of time the Board's
adjudicative process takes.4 The general counsel's initiative aims to shorten
the Board's timeline in determining whether to seek this type of injunction
by implementing strict time limits for each step of the process.' If the Board
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012. I would like to thank my note editors, Matthew Miller
and Adam Teitelbaum, for their helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank Professor
James J. Prescott for his insight and feedback. I am additionally grateful to Professor Nicholas
Bagley and Rohan Pai, who graciously provided comments on drafts, as well as the Honorable
Robert Holmes Bell and his staff, who provided the experience that served as the inspiration
behind this Note. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents and Suzanne Cambou for
their support throughout this process. This Note is dedicated to my late grandfather, the Hon-
orable Stephen W. Karr.
1. Philip A. Miscimarra et al., Acting NLRB General Counsel Announces a "Renewed
Agency-Wide Focus on Interim Injunctive Relief', MONDAQ (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.
mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=l 12010.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (2006). This provision was included in the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments to the NLRA in 1947. See Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120,
sec. 101, § 10(j), 61 Stat. 136, 149 (1947). Note that the statutory language is codified under a
different section number in the United States Code. This Note will follow previous scholars in
using the applicable session law section number in text while using the United States Code
section number in citations.
3. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., ELECTRONIC
REDACTED SECTION 10(J) MANUAL USERS GUIDE 4-9 (2002).
4. See S. REP. No. 80-105, at 8 (1947), reprinted in I U.S. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS
BD., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 414
(1948). Without an injunction, there is often a significant danger of irreparable harm occurring
before the Board can put a stop to an unfair labor practice. Id. at 433; see also Catherine L.
Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its
Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2028 (2009) (arguing
that judicial limitations on section 100) injunctive relief "create[] a huge incentive for em-
ployers to deliberately violate the statute knowing that they will reap the benefit of illegal
conduct for a long time, if not permanently in the case of a successful defeat of an organizing
campaign").
5. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., EFFECTIVE SECTION
10(j) REMEDIES FOR UNLAWFUL DISCHARGES IN ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS 2 (2010), available
[Vol. 110:127
Deconstructing "Just and Proper" Arguments
were able to process section 10(j) requests faster, it would have the oppor-
tunity to bring suit in court more often, which would likely lead to an
increase in the number of section 10(j) petitions for injunctive relief the
Board seeks. This likely increase should carry with it a renewed focus on the
standards courts use to resolve section 10(j) petitions.
Section 10(j) provides as follows:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint ... charging
that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to
petition any United States district court ... for appropriate temporary re-
lief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court...
shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or re-
straining order as it deems just and proper.6
A circuit split exists over the proper interpretation of this just and proper
standard.7 Although many different approaches have been adopted since the
passage of section 10(j) in 1947, the federal courts of appeals currently fol-
low two distinct approaches.8 The Third, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits currently favor the "remedial purpose" approach, which requires the
court to consider only whether injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the
remedial powers of the Board.9 In contrast, the First, Second, Fourth, Sev-
enth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits favor the traditional "equitable principles"
approach, which is used for general injunctions.' 0 This approach asks the
court to consider (1) the petitioning party's likelihood of success on the mer-
its, (2) the possibility of irreparable harm to the petitioning party if relief is
not granted, (3) the extent to which the balance of hardships favors the
at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/ldue-89sqj2/$File/NLRB%20GC%2OMemo%2010-
07.pdf. The new process's expedited timeline requires regional directors to, inter alia, obtain
all of the charging party's evidence within fourteen days and make a decision on the merits of
the case within forty-nine days. Id. at 2-3.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (2006) (emphasis added).
7. Some courts incorporate a "reasonable cause" prong. However, this prong is ig-
nored for the sake of this Note because "the 'reasonable cause' test is generally a non-factor
for all the circuits." Richard B. Lapp, A Call for a Simpler Approach: Examining the NLRA's
Section 10(j) Standard, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 251, 268 (2001).
8. Previous standards used include (1) the irreparable harm standard, (2) the status quo
standard, (3) the public interest standard, and (4) the legislative purpose standard. Leslie A.
Fahrenkopf, Note, Striking the "Just and Proper Balance": A Call for Traditional Equitable
Criteria for Section 10(j) Injunctions, 80 VA. L. REV. 1159, 1172 (1994).
9. See, e.g., Overstreet ex rel. NLRB v. El Paso Elec. Co., 176 E App'x 607 (5th Cir.
2006); Ahearn ex rel. NLRB v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 351 F3d 226 (6th Cir. 2003); Sharp ex
rel. NLRB v. Webco Indus., Inc., 225 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2000); Hirsch ex rel. NLRB v.
Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 147 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 1998); Arlook ex rel. NLRB v. S. Lichtenberg &
Co., 952 F.2d 367 (1 1th Cir. 1992). This approach is often confusingly called the "just and
proper" approach. For clarity's sake, I refer to it as the "remedial purpose" approach instead.
10. See, e.g., McDermott ex rel. NLRB v. Ampersand Publ'g, L.L.C., 593 F3d 950 (9th
Cir. 2010); Mattina ex rel. NLRB v. Kingsbridge Heights Rehab. & Care Ctr., 329 F. App'x
319 (2d Cir. 2009); Muffley ex rel. NLRB v. Spartan Mining Co., 570 F.3d 534 (4th Cir.
2009); Pye ex rel. NLRB v. Excel Case Ready, 238 F.3d 69 (Ist Cir. 2001); Sharp ex rel.
NLRB v. Parents in Cmty. Action, Inc., 172 E3d 1034 (8th Cir. 1999); Kinney ex rel. NLRB v.
Pioneer Press, 881 E2d 485 (7th Cir. 1989).
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respective parties, and (4) whether the public interest will be advanced by
granting the relief." As a practical matter, the remedial purpose approach
results in greater judicial deference to the Board's determinations than the
equitable principles approach.
This Note argues that courts that have adopted the equitable principles
approach have inappropriately removed the just and proper standard of sec-
tion 10(j) from its structural and historical context. This context reveals the
remedial purpose approach as the best representation of congressional in-
tent. Part I examines the two major judicial approaches and the justifications
behind them. It then reviews these justifications in light of the use of the just
and proper standard in two other provisions of the NLRA, concluding that
the statutory structure supports the remedial purpose reasoning. Part I ex-
pands this structural argument by examining the public policy consequences
of the unique congressional mandate embodied in section 10(). Congress's
mandate means that section 10(j) injunctions are different from ordinary
injunctions in ways that support Part I's finding that congressional intent
favors the remedial purpose approach. Next, Part III looks at section 10(j)'s
legislative history and finds that this history reinforces the conclusion that
Congress intended for courts to apply the remedial purpose approach. Last-
ly, Part IV addresses a common concern that the remedial purpose approach
removes courts from the section 10() process altogether, allowing Board
bias to unfairly influence injunction decisions. This Part finds such a con-
cern unwarranted.
I. THE USE OF "JUST AND PROPER" IN NLRA
SECTIONS 10(E) AND 10(F)
Both judicial approaches to the just and proper standard of section 100)
recognize the congressional purpose to preserve the Board's remedial pow-
ers. Both sides also agree that by forcing a return to the previolation status
quo, section 10() relief preserves the Board's powers by preventing the oc-
currence of irreparable harm that would make final Board adjudication on
the merits meaningless. 2 However, they disagree on Congress's other pur-
poses in enacting section 10(0). Proponents of the remedial purpose
approach argue that section 100) was passed to limit judicial discretion. 3 In
11. See, e.g., Ampersand Publ'g, 593 E3d at 957; Parents in Cmty. Action, 172 F.3d at
1038 n.2; Rivera-Vega ex rel. NLRB v. ConAgra, Inc., 70 F.3d 153, 164 (1st Cir. 1995).
12. Compare Glasser ex rel. NLRB v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 379 E App'x 483, 485
(6th Cir. 2010) ("The purpose of a § 10() injunction is 'to give the Board a means of preserv-
ing the status quo pending completion of its regular procedures which might be ineffective if
immediate relief cannot be granted.'" (quoting Calatrello ex rel. NLRB v. Automatic Sprinkler
Corp. of Am., 55 F.3d 208, 214 (6th Cir. 1995))), with Hoffman ex rel. NLRB v. Inn Credible
Caterers, Ltd., 247 F3d 360, 368 (2d Cir. 2001) ("One of the underlying purposes of § 10(j) is
to preserve the status quo....").
13. See Sarah Pring, Note, Justice Delayed, Justice Denied: The Detroit Newspaper
Strike and the Future of Section 10(j) Injunctions in the Sixth Circuit, 47 WAYNE L. REv. 277,
303-04 (2001) (arguing that section 10(j) was intended to focus judicial scrutiny on protecting
the remedial powers of the Board rather than vindicating the rights of private parties).
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contrast, proponents of the equitable principles approach believe section
10(j) was passed to curtail labor power. 14 Though these two differing views
of congressional intent are not facially incompatible, the two judicial ap-
proaches they underlie have proved to be incompatible in practice. While
proponents of both approaches look to the language of section 10(j) for sup-
port, section 10(j)'s structural context-the use of the just and proper
standard in two other provisions of the NLRA-reveals that the remedial
purpose approach is most compatible with Congress's intent.
The remedial purpose approach claims to more accurately reflect the
congressional intent of section 10(j) because it results in the limited judicial
discretion intended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which amended the NLRA in
1947.15 The approach encourages courts to defer to administrative findings
and establishes a presumption in favor of granting injunctive relief. It re-
quires the Board to demonstrate only that injunctive relief is necessary to
preserve the remedial purpose of the NLRA. 16 Under this approach, courts
should defer to the Board's determination of whether an unfair labor prac-
tice has occurred in lieu of considering the merits of the case itself 1 7 This
deference requires courts to determine whether the Board's legal theory is
supported by the facts and not to substitute their own legal theory or analy-
sis.'8
In contrast, the equitable principles approach is supported by the view
that the Taft-Hartley amendments were enacted to curtail labor power.19 Ac-
cording to the Eighth Circuit, section 10(j) "is a limited exception to the
federal policy against labor injunctions."20 Deference to administrative find-
ings, according to proponents of the equitable principles approach, unfairly
tips the scales in favor of labor, contrary to Congress's statutory intent to
14. See Lapp, supra note 7, at 262 (arguing that "preventing union abuses" was one of
the main rationales underlying the enactment of section 10(j)).
15. See Lysa M. Saltzman & Antonio Salazar-Hobson, The Ultimate Hangup on the
NLRA: Denial of Section 10(J) Injunctive Relief for La Conexion Familiar, 32 CAL. W. L.
REV. 225, 234-35 (1996). Section 10(j) was added to the NLRA as part of the Taft-Hartley
Act. See supra note 2.
16. See, e.g., Ahearn ex rel. NLRB v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 351 E3d 226, 237 (6th Cir.
2003); Sharp ex rel. NLRB v. Webco Indus., Inc., 225 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 2000);
Hirsch ex rel. NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 147 F.3d 243, 247 (3d Cir. 1998); Arlook ex rel.
NLRB v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., 952 F.2d 367, 371 (11th Cir. 1992); Boire ex rel. NLRB v.
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1188-89 (5th Cir. 1975). While courts following
the remedial purpose approach do not specify the level of deference owed to the Board's find-
ings concerning whether injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the remedial purpose of the
NLRA, I advocate for the use of the substantial-evidence level. See infra Part IV.
17. See Pring, supra note 13, at 290-91 (citing Frye ex rel. NLRB v. Specialty Enve-
lope, Inc., 10 F.3d 1221, 1224 (6th Cir. 1993)).
18. See Glasser ex rel. NLRB v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 379 F. App'x 483, 485 n.2 (6th
Cir. 2010).
19. See Fahrenkopf, supra note 8, at 1189; see also Sharp ex rel. NLRB v. Parents in
Cmty. Action, Inc., 172 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 1999); Kinney ex rel. NLRB v. Pioneer
Press, 881 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1989).
20. Parents in Cmty. Action, 172 E3d at 1037.
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protect the rights of management as well as labor.21 However, many courts
that apply this approach advocate for keeping the congressional purpose to
preserve the Board's remedial powers in mind while applying the four
prongs of the equitable principles approach. 22 When discussing the standard
of review, these courts often claim that deference toward the Board's find-
ings is appropriate.23  When it comes to actually applying the equitable
principles, however, these courts make no mention of deference and treat the
Board as if it were any other party.24 In any event, most proponents of the
eqtitable principles approach agree that section 10(j) relief is a remedy re-
served for serious and extraordinary circumstances.2 1
Both camps in the circuit split argue that the language of section 10(j)
supports their approach. 26 Central to this debate is the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, which, although it did not address
section 10() in particular, discussed injunctive relief in general.2 7 Romero-
Barcelo held that if Congress wanted courts to avoid using the equitable
principles approach, it could "intervene and guide or control the exercise of
the courts' discretion."28 This language has been interpreted to mean that
"when a federal statute authorizes injunctive relief, the presumption is that
Congress intends the courts to exercise their traditional equitable discre-
tion. '29 Therefore, both sides have looked to the language of section 10(j) to
determine whether Congress provided any guidance.30
21. See Fahrenkopf, supra note 8, at 1189; see also Michael C. Duff, Embracing Para-
dox: Three Problems the NLRB Must Confront to Resist Further Erosion of Labor Rights in
the Expanding Immigrant Workplace, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 133, 185 (2009)
("[T]he Seventh Circuit's formulation [which includes the traditional equitable principles] is
reasonably representative of the standard the NLRB often finds most difficult to meet.").
22. See, e.g., Mattina ex rel. NLRB v. Kingsbridge Heights Rehab. & Care Ctr., 329 F.
App'x 319 (2d Cir. 2009); Muffley ex rel. NLRB v. Spartan Mining Co., 570 F.3d 534 (4th
Cir. 2009); Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994).
23. See, e.g., Kingsbridge, 329 F. App'x at 321 (quoting Silverman v. Major League
Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 67 F.3d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1995)); Cal. Pac. Med.
Ctr., 19 E3d at 460.
24. See, e.g., Kingsbridge, 329 E App'x at 321 (making no more references to defer-
ence after stating in the standard of review that deference was appropriate); Cal. Pac. Med.
Ctr., 19 F.3d at 460 (same).
25. See Fahrenkopf, supra note 8, at 1189. Contra Pioneer Press, 881 E2d at 493
("[N]o rule of law limits injunctive relief to 'serious and extraordinary circumstances.' ").
26. Compare Abearn ex rel. NLRB v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 351 F3d 226, 235 (6th Cir.
2003) (dismissing respondent's argument that Sixth Circuit precedent in a Title VII case com-
pelled the use of the equitable principles approach in section 10(j) cases on the ground that
Title VII does not have the same "just and proper" language as section 10(j)), with Spartan
Mining, 570 F.3d at 541-42 (arguing that "just and proper" in section 10(j) is just another way
of saying "equitable").
27. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
28. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313.
29. Sharp ex rel. NLRB v. Parents in Cmty. Action, Inc., 172 F.3d 1034, 1038 (8th Cir.
1999).
30. See supra note 26.
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According to proponents of the equitable principles approach, the words
"just and proper" are not enough to overcome the Romero-Barcelo presump-
tion.31 For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that "'just and proper' is
another way of saying 'appropriate' or 'equitable.' "32 Likewise, the Fourth
Circuit, in agreement, has held that "the phrase 'just and proper' does not
evince a 'necessary and inescapable' congressional intent to depart from
traditional equitable standards."33
These arguments have yet to be convincingly countered by proponents
of the remedial purpose approach. For example, in response to a party's ar-
gument that the remedial purpose approach was in violation of Romero-
Barcelo, the Sixth Circuit unpersuasively responded that "[i]f the current
[Sixth Circuit] 10(j) standard were in clear contravention of Supreme Court
precedent, it seems unlikely that this or any other circuit would have contin-
ued to adhere to it for two decades without concern. '3 4
However, the lack of an adequate judicial argument does not necessarily
mean that proponents of the equitable principles approach are correct.
Romero-Barcelo provided that a "necessary and inescapable inference" of
Congress's desire to have the courts avoid the use of the equitable principles
approach would be sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of those
principles.3 5 Courts searching for evidence of a "necessary and inescapable
inference" in other statutes have held that a statute's language, purpose, his-
tory, structure, and underlying policy are relevant factors to consider.36
Looking at other uses of "just and proper" in the NLRA provides evi-
dence of a "necessary and inescapable inference" that "just and proper"
does not mean equitable. For example, the structures of NLRA sections
10(e) and (f) are parallel to that of section 100).3 7 Section 10(e) provides as
follows:
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the Unit-
ed States ... for the enforcement of [a Board] order and for appropriate
temporary relief or restraining order, and .... the court ... shall have
31. See, e.g., Spartan Mining, 570 F.3d at 542; Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal. Pac. Med.
Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 456-60 (9th Cir. 1994).
32. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d at 458.
33. Spartan Mining, 570 E3d at 542 (quoting Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313).
34. Ahearn ex rel. NLRB v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 351 E3d 226, 235 (6th Cir. 2003).
35. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (quoting Porter v. Warren Holding Co.,
328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 E3d 219, 233 (3d Cir. 2005);
Bedrossian v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 409 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mass.
Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d 36, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2001).
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f), (j) (2006). This language also appears in section 10(1),
which governs specific unfair labor practices by unions. § 160(l). As section 10(l) also governs
district court jurisdiction over the Board's petitions for preliminary injunctions and has led to




power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just
and proper ... 38
Similarly, section 10(f) provides that "[u]pon the filing of such petition [for
review of a final order of the Board], the court shall ... have the same juris-
diction [as under section 10(e)] to grant ... such temporary relief or
restraining order as it deems just and proper."39 All three sections thus in-
clude the same standard, instructing the court to grant such injunctive relief
"as it deems just and proper."' However, sections 10(e) and (f) govern situa-
tions in which the equitable principles approach is inappropriate and in
which deferential review of Board adjudications is required."
There is a presumption in statutory construction that "equivalent words
have equivalent meaning when repeated in the same statute. '42 Moreover,
sections 10(e) and (f) were passed twelve years before section 10(j). 43 The
parallel structure of all three sections makes it likely that Congress viewed
section 10(j) as a parallel situation to sections 10(e) and (f) and looked at
those sections in constructing section 10(j).4 While no Board adjudication is
made under section 10(j), there is a Board decision-the decision, after a
thorough investigation, to seek section 10(j) relief.45 It is not uncommon for
courts to treat nonadjudicatory agency decisions with deference. 46
38. § 160(e).
39. § 160(f).
40. § 160(e)-(f), (j).
41. See, e.g., Beth Isr. Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978) ("The judicial role
[under section 10(e)] is narrow: The rule which the Board adopts is judicially reviewable for
consistency with the Act, and for rationality, but if it satisfies those criteria ... [it] must be
enforced"); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (concluding that
section 10(f)'s requirements do not mean "that even as to matters not requiring expertise a
court may displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the
court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo"). It
is noteworthy that Congress would have been aware of this practice of deferential review for
sections 10(e) and (f) before the passage of section 10(j) in 1947. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane
Co. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 423, 433 (10th Cir. 1944) ("[The Board] has the exclusive province
[under section 10(f)] of appraising conflicting and circumstantial evidence, the weight and
credibility of testimony and of drawing inferences from established facts."); NLRB v. Lion
Shoe Co., 97 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1938) ("The findings of fact by the Board [under section
10(e)] are conclusive if supported by any substantial evidence.").
42. Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220 (1998).
43. Sections 10(e) and (f) were original provisions of the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act of 1935, ch. 372, sec. 10(e)-(f), 49 Stat. 449, 454-55, while section 10(j) was
added in 1947 as part of the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec.
101, § 10(j), 61 Stat. 136, 149 (1947).
44. See Lapp, supra note 7, at 284. See generally, United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.
455 U.S. 16 (1982) (using statutory structure to determine congressional intent).
45. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 3, at 10 (discussing the Board's
investigatory process after receiving a complaint and detailing the factors the Board considers
before seeking section 10(j) relief in court).
46. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("The fact that the Admin-
istrator's policies and standards are not reached by trial in adversary form does not mean that
they are not entitled to respect."). The Board's decision is the result of a formal process. See
[Vol. 110:127
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While this parallel structure supports the use of the remedial purpose
approach for section 10(), it may not on its own merit a Romero-Barcelo
"necessary and inescapable inference" that Congress desired courts to avoid
the use of the equitable principles approach. It is possible that Congress did
not intend a single meaning for "just and proper" but instead simply desired
that courts apply the normal standards they would traditionally apply for
each situation.47 However, as Part II demonstrates, this argument is not via-
ble. Part II explores the public policy ramifications of the congressional
mandate embodied in section 10(j) that further support the existence of a
"necessary and inescapable inference" that Congress intended courts to ap-
ply the remedial purpose approach rather than the equitable principles
approach.
II. CONGRESS'S UNIQUE MANDATE TO THE BOARD IN SECTION 10(J)
Congress's grant of permissive power to the Board to seek injunctive re-
lief under section 100) supports the use of the remedial purpose approach.
This mandate resulted in two differences between section 10(j) injunctions
and general injunctions that, when considering Congress's delegation of
adjudicatory power to the Board, support a Romero-Barcelo "necessary and
inescapable inference" of congressional intent to avoid the use of the equi-
table principles approach and support the use of a deferential standard of
review.
First, section 100) petitions are screened by the Board before reaching
the court, unlike general injunctions that reach the judiciary without any
prior screening.48 Because Congress provided for this screening process
(through the permissive nature of its delegation of authority in section
100)),4 9 the Board's findings should receive deference as an exercise of its
special expertise.
Second, unlike with ordinary injunctions, 0 Congress has entrusted
someone other than the judiciary to protect the public policy concerns at
stake in section 10(j) petitions.5 Congress's mandate that the Board have
exclusive jurisdiction to bring section 10(j) claims52  demonstrates
OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 3, at 10-11 (laying down formal rules and guide-
lines for the Board to follow in determining whether to seek section 10(j) relief in court).
However, even if the Board's decision in these instances were considered the result of infor-
mal processes, an argument also exists that they should receive deference. See Bradley Lipton,
Note, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 119 YALE L.J. 2096, 2101
(2010) ("Informal agency decisions deserve substantial deference from courts because agency
officials are politically accountable even when acting informally.').
47. See, e.g., Lapp, supra note 7, at 264 ("Congress assumed that labor injunction cases
should be decided like any preliminary injunction case-using traditional equitable notions to
come to a conclusion that is just and proper.").
48. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 3, at 11.
49. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
50. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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Congress's belief that the public interest at stake would be best protected by
the Board, which, as an administrative agency, is publicly accountable.53
This accountability supports the use of a deferential standard of review.
In light of these differences, it is unlikely that Congress intended for
courts to apply the normal injunction standard. Moreover, both differences
support the contention that Congress intended for courts to follow the reme-
dial purpose approach and, concomitantly, to defer to the Board.
A. Pre-Court Screening of Petitions
The first important difference between section 10(j) injunctions and
general injunctions is that section 10(j) petitions are screened before reach-
ing a court. This screening comes about because an aggrieved party is
unable to seek relief individually under section 100).14 After an unfair la-
bor practice complaint has been filed, only the Board has standing to seek
an injunction under section 10(j) on behalf of an aggrieved party." How-
ever, the Board need not exercise its power to seek an injunction under
section 10(j) in every case. Congress provided that the Board "shall have
power" to seek injunctive relief under section 10(j),5 6 indicating support for
a Board screening process. 57 In line with this statutory language, the Board
screens the complaints it receives, in order to focus its resources on the
complaints it deems most meritorious.58 The end result is that, unlike with
ordinary petitions for injunctive relief, many complaints for section 10(j)
relief are dismissed in a screening process and never brought before a
judge.59
This type of procedure is unique in the context of injunctions. In no oth-
er situation is a party's petition for injunctive relief mandatorily subjected to
a screening process not applied by a court.60 This provision for Board in-
53. See, e.g., BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 542 (2002) (calling the
Board a "politically accountable administrative agency"). The specific public policy concerns
at stake are discussed infra in Part I.B.
54. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 517
(1955) ("To hold that the Taft-Hartley Act also authorizes a private litigant to secure interim
relief would be to ignore the closely circumscribed jurisdiction given to the District Court and
to generalize where Congress has chosen to specify.").
55. See id. (noting Congress's desire to curtail private plaintiffs' ability to sue for "in-
terim relief").
56. 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (2006).
57. See George Schatzki, Some Observations About the Standards Applied to Labor
Injunction Litigation Under Sections 10(j) and 10(l) of the National Labor Relations Act, 59
IND. L.J. 565, 569 (1984) (arguing that Congress "clearly" intended the choice to be made by
the Board). In contrast, NLRA section 10(l) provides that the Board "shall" petition a district
court for injunctive relief. § 160(l).
58. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 3, at 10-11.
59. See id. at 9-14 (discussing the numerous evaluations that complaints of unfair labor
practices must successfully undergo before the Board will seek section 10(j) relief in court).
60. The closest comparison comes up under Title VII Section 706(0(2) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-
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volvement at this stage of the process indicates congressional intent for the
Board to use its special expertise. The use of this expertise provides support
for treating labor injunctions differently than ordinary injunctions and using
a standard of review that defers to this initial screening process.
The Board takes its congressional mandate seriously by employing an
intensive screening process for deciding which unfair labor practice com-
plaints merit section 10(j) relief. If a dispute is proposed for section 10(j)
relief, local Board agents do significant research, including questioning wit-
nesses about the impact of the alleged violations and gathering objective
and subjective evidence.61 In addition to considering the gathered evi-
dence, these local agents consider the gravity of the alleged violations as
well as the threat of remedial failure in light of the "just and proper" theo-
ries set forth in precedent.62 If a dispute is still considered worthy of section
10(j) relief after all this research, local agents prepare a memorandum high-
lighting the relevant facts, legal arguments, and authorities. 63  This
memorandum is then presented to an Injunction Litigation Branch ("ILB")
attorney for an independent review and evaluation, during which time the
local agents continue to monitor the effects of the unfair labor practice and
to pursue settlement. 64 After reviewing the local agents' continuing evalua-
tions and the ILB's independent evaluation, if the Board is satisfied that sec-
section 10(j) relief is merited, only then does the Board petition a district
court on behalf of the aggrieved party.65
The remedial purpose approach recognizes the need for deference to this
screening process.66 By contrast, the equitable principles approach views
deference as inappropriate, which is most evident in its determination that
17 (2006)), which authorizes the EEOC to seek a preliminary injunction on behalf of a dis-
criminated-against employee after a preliminary investigation. However, the key difference is
that section 706(f)(2) does not preclude employees from bringing a private cause of action for
a preliminary injunction and, thus, avoiding the EEOC's screening process. See Jan Lesly
Lettes, Note, Irreparable Injury: Improper Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief in
EEOC Cases?, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (1986) ("To obtain a preliminary injunction,
either the employee or the EEOC acting on the employee's behalf petitions a federal court
under section 706(0(2) of Title VII").
61. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 3, at 10-11.
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id. at 12-13. This memorandum also includes defenses and arguments raised by the
party accused of unfair labor practices, responses to each defense and argument, and an analy-
sis of why injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the remedial power of the Board. Id.
64. Id. at 14.
65. See id.
66. See, e.g., Pascarell ex rel. NLRB v. Vibra Screw Inc., 904 F2d 874, 881 (3d Cir.
1990) ("[T]here is a certain leniency that the Board must be afforded, stemming from the
deference to the Board that is built into the statutory scheme."); Maram ex rel. NLRB v. Uni-
versidad Interamericana de P.R., Inc., 722 F.2d 953, 960 (1st Cir. 1983) ("[The Board's]
decision is entitled to presumptive weight."); Silverman ex rel. NLRB v. 40-41 Realty As-
socs., 668 F.2d 678, 681 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[S]ound administration of the Act requires
appropriate deference to the expertise of the Board.").
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section 10(j) relief is worthy only in extraordinary cases.67 When determin-
ing a petition's merits under each prong of the equitable principles
approach, a circuit applying this approach would take into account whether
a petition's underlying facts are extraordinary.
68
Judging the extraordinariness of such facts in order to determine a peti-
tion's worthiness for injunctive relief undermines Congress's delegation of
power to the Board. The Board, acting pursuant to Congress's mandate, has
already deemed the facts underlying a section 10(j) petition that passes its
screening process worthy enough to merit relief.69
Having two standards of worthiness7 ° violates delegation principles be-
cause the Board uses its labor relations expertise in its determination; courts
are required to give deference to agency decisions and interpretations that
are based upon their expertise.7 1 When an agency employs its special exper-
tise, a difference of opinion is not enough to overcome the presumption of
67. The equitable principles approach has traditionally viewed injunctive relief in gen-
eral-not just under section 10(j)-as an extraordinary remedy. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
68. See Kobell ex rel. NLRB v. Suburban Lines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1076, 1091 n.26 (3d Cir.
1984) (noting that "an argument" could be made for recognizing "that section 10(j) was re-
served for the extraordinary case"). Suburban Lines suggested that the district court could
have applied the guiding principle that section 10(j) is reserved for the extraordinary case and
dismissed the petition for not being extraordinary enough to warrant undermining the normal
processes of labor law adjudication. Id.; see also Bloedorn ex rel. NLRB v. Francisco Foods,
Inc., 276 F.3d 270, 297 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Section 10(j) is itself an extraordinary remedy."
(quoting Szabo ex rel. NLRB v. P*I*E* Nationwide, Inc., 878 F.2d 207, 209 (7th Cir. 1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Sharp ex rel. NLRB v. Parents in Cmty. Action, Inc., 172
F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[Section 10(j)] is reserved for serious and extraordinary
cases." (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter ex rel. NLRB, 385 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir.
1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a scholarly take, see Catherine Hodgman
Helm, Comment, The Practicality of Increasing the Use of NLRA Section 10(j) Injunctions, 7
INDUS. REL. L.J. 599, 631 (1985) (arguing that because judges are not very receptive to sec-
tion 10(j) petitions they view section 10(j) as an extraordinary remedy that must rest on
extraordinary facts). While this consideration primarily occurs in circuits that apply the equi-
table principles approach, it also arises in circuits applying the "remedial purpose" test. See,
e.g., Overstreet ex rel. NLRB v. El Paso Elec. Co., 176 F App'x 607 (5th Cir. 2006); Arlook ex
rel. NLRB v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., 952 F.2d 367, 371 (11 th Cir. 1992).
69. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 3, at 4.
70. The two standards of worthiness are the courts' standard-facts extraordinary
enough to merit injunctive relief-and the NLRB's standard-facts possessing enough merit
to satisfy the Board's internal evaluation process.
71. See generally United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 778 (1997) ("[W]e would
give the Commission considerable interpretive leeway in light of the fact that the choice here
at issue lies at the very heart of the Commission's policy-related 'expertise.' "); Pension Bene-
fit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990) ("[P]ractical agency expertise is
one of the principal justifications behind ... deference."); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845 (1986) ("An agency's expertise is superior to that of a
court when a dispute centers on whether a particular regulation is 'reasonably necessary to
effectuate any of the provisions or to accomplish any of the purposes' of the Act the agency is
charged with enforcing; the agency's position, in such circumstances, is therefore due substan-
tial deference.").
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deference that must be applied to its interpretation.12 Moreover, deference is
not precluded just because a decision or interpretation is nonadjudicatory.73
While a valid worry exists that the NLRB could abuse its power and seek
section 10(j) relief in unworthy cases, the courts, with their discretion to
grant or deny the petition,74 are still able to serve as a check on this potential
abuse of power.75
B. Protection of Public Policy Concerns
Public policy concerns are at stake in every section 10(j) petition. Unlike
with ordinary injunctions, Congress, through the mandate of section 10(j),
entrusted the Board to protect these concerns. 76 As Congress explained, "We
have provided that the Board, acting in the public interest and not in vindi-
cation of purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief in the case of all
types of unfair labor practices ... ,77 The public interest at stake is the "in-
terest in the peaceful 'settlement of labor disputes through the collective
bargaining [process].' "I' The remedial purpose approach does a superior job
of protecting these public interest concerns because it focuses on the preser-
vation of the Board's remedial powers and leaves the decisionmaking in the
hands of the Board, which, unlike the court, is publicly accountable. 79
It is important that the preservation of the Board's remedial powers be at
the forefront of a court's analysis, because these powers are essential to the
Board's ability to vindicate the public interest in the peaceful resolution of
labor disputes.80 A reduction of the Board's remedial powers diminishes the
72. See NLRB v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 646 F2d 1352, 1367 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that
the Board's interpretation of labor contracts falls within its area of special expertise and that
inferences are insufficient to overcome the required deference).
73. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (2006).
75. The nature of the deference required under the remedial purpose approach is dis-
cussed infra in Part IV, as is the courts' ability under this approach to serve as a check on
potential Board abuses of power.
76. An argument could be made that if Congress truly intended to entrust the Board to
protect these interests, it would have authorized the Board to issue injunctions and leave the
courts out of the process. However, this argument ignores the value of having both the courts
and the Board involved in the injunction process. Preserving the power to issue an injunction
in the hands of the judiciary provides a system of checks and balances and limits Board bias.
See infra Part IV.
77. S. REP. No. 80-105, at 8 (1947), reprinted in 1 U.S. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 414 (1948).
78. Pring, supra note 13, at 289 (quoting Kobell ex rel. NLRB v. Beverly Health &
Rehab. Servs., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 409, 414 (W.D. Pa. 1997), aff'd, 142 F.3d 428 (3d Cir.
1998)) (arguing that the Board's determination should thus be afforded deferential treatment).
79. See, e.g., BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 542 (2002) (calling the
Board a "politically accountable administrative agency").
80. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. There is also some scholarship that
the equitable principles are an inappropriate tool for addressing a statutory injunction intended
to remedy public wrongs. See Fahrenkopf, supra note 8, at 1174 ("Critics assert that the tradi-
tional equitable principles used for private relief are inappropriate for addressing a statutory
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likelihood that labor disputes will be resolved peacefully. As Congress ex-
plained, "Time is usually of the essence in these matters."'" If an injunction
is not ordered in a case of a real unfair labor practice, there is a serious dan-
ger that the alleged violator could reap the benefits of its violation. Congress
explicitly warned of the need to avoid this situation, stating as follows:
Experience under the National Labor Relations Act has demonstrated that
by reason of lengthy hearings and litigation enforcing its orders, the Board
has not been able in some instances to correct unfair labor practices until
after substantial injury has been done. ... Since the Board's orders are not
self-enforcing, it has sometimes been possible for persons violating the act
to accomplish their unlawful objective before being placed under any legal
restraint and thereby to make it impossible or not feasible to restore or pre-
serve the status quo pending litigation.82
Perhaps recognizing these concerns, many courts applying the equitable
principles approach advocate taking into account the need to preserve the
Board's remedial powers.8 3 Nonetheless, the equitable principles approach
does not preclude these courts from dismissing petitions without ever taking
that need into account. For example, a petition can be dismissed for failing
to satisfy the first prong of the equitable principles approach-the likelihood
of success on the merits-without the court ever reaching the issue of
whether or not injunctive relief is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to
the Board's remedial powers. 84 In contrast, the remedial purpose approach
injunction intended to remedy public wrongs."); Note, Temporary Injunctions Under 10(j) of
the Taft-Hartley Act, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 195 (1969) ("It is well established that when a
federal court derives jurisdiction over a proceeding for injunctive relief solely by reason of a
statute, the traditional standards governing the issuance of such relief in private actions ... are
not pre-requisites for the granting of statutory relief unless the congressional enabling act so
provides'"); see also Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F2d 1185, 1192
(5th Cir. 1975) ("[T]raditional rules of equity may not control the proper scope of 10(j) relief
.. ..'). However, this debate relies on antiquated arguments and has never been widely accept-
ed.
81. S. REP. No. 80-105, at 8 (1947), reprinted in I U.S. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 414 (1948).
82. Id. at 433; accord Fisk & Malamud, supra note 4, at 2028 (arguing that judicial
limitations on section 10(j) injunctive relief "create[] a huge incentive for employers to delib-
erately violate the statute knowing that they will reap the benefit of illegal conduct for a long
time, if not permanently in the case of a successful defeat of an organizing campaign").
83. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Scott ex rel. NLRB v. Stephen Dunn & Assocs., 241 F.3d 652, 666 (9th
Cir. 2001) ("Because the district court held that the Board had not shown a likelihood of suc-
cess ... it did not assess whether the failure to issue an injunction would cause irreparable
harm to the Board's remedial authority."). While Stephen Dunn reversed the district court, it
did so on the grounds that the Board had shown a sufficient likelihood of success, not because
the district court had not considered irreparable harm to the Board's remedial power. Id.; see
also Small ex rel. NLRB v. Swift Transp. Co., No. CV 09-4751 PSG (FMOx), 2009 WL
3052637 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009). Swift Transportation Co. denied the Board's section 10(j)
petition for failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits without addressing the re-
maining three prongs of the test, including, notably, the possibility of irreparable harm to the
Board's remedial authority. Swift Transp. Co., 2009 WL 3052637, at * 16.
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requires the issuance of injunctive relief in every case in which such relief is
deemed necessary.85 Therefore, the remedial purpose approach allows for
better preservation of the Board's remedial powers and the associated public
interest at stake.
The use of the remedial purpose approach is also supported by the fact
that its implicit deference leaves the decisionmaking in the hands of the
Board, which is publicly accountable.8 6 According to Congress, when the
Board seeks injunctive relief under section 10(j), it is making a "public in-
terest" decision. 87 In order to ensure consistency with the preferences of the
majority of Americans, a policymaking body must be accountable to vot-
ers.88  According to the Supreme Court, the Board satisfies this
requirement.89 Although Board members are not directly elected by voters,
they are appointed to five-year terms by the president, who is elected.9" This
type of presidential influence, along with the concomitant power to remove
agency members for cause, fosters accountability.9" Moreover, accountabil-
ity for agencies comes from the "demanding expectations that reasons will
be given in public and subjected to intense scrutiny. 92
85. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 542 (2002) (calling the
Board a "politically accountable administrative agency that acts as a screen for meritless com-
plaints").
87. S. REP. No. 80-105, at 8 (1947), reprinted in 1 U.S. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 414 (1948);
see also Lipton, supra note 46, at 2101 ("Informal agency decisions deserve substantial defer-
ence from courts because agency officials are politically accountable even when acting
informally.").
88. Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1254
(2009) ("[Vloters must be able to hold public officials accountable for their specific policy
choices to ensure that those decisions are consistent with the preferences of a majority.").
89. BE & K Constr Co., 536 U.S. at 542.
90. The Board, NLRB.Gov, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board (last visited Apr. 2,
2011).
91. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) ("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and
it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices ...."). In addition to the influence of the appointment power, other reasons for this
accountability include presidential pressure to follow specific policy recommendations and the
president's ability to remove support in negotiations in Congress over agency budget and other
matters. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independ-
ence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 632 (2010). Contra Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule,
Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SuP. CT. REV. 51, 88 (2007) (arguing
that presidential oversight might actually taint an administrative agency's accountability);
Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2010) (suggesting that the question of whether presidential influence
increases or decreases the accountability of an agency's decision depends on the content of the
influence).
92. Stephen Macedo, Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and. Institutional
Design, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1037 (2010).
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By contrast, the judicial branch's design does not promote accountabil-
ity.93 Article III of the Constitution provides that "Judges ... shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Con-
tinuance in Office."94 These provisions, which provide federal judges with
lifetime tenure and a fixed compensation, are incompatible with political
accountability.95 In fact, the very purpose of these provisions was to ensure
that the judiciary would be "insulated from majoritarian pressures."96 The
remedial purpose approach thus ensures that it is the publicly accountable
Board that is making decisions about the peaceful resolution of labor dis-
putes and not the unaccountable courts.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 10(J)
Section 10(j)'s legislative history reinforces the structural and policy
support for the "necessary and inescapable inference" that Congress intend-
ed courts to avoid the use of the equitable principles approach and instead
apply the remedial purpose approach. The proper understanding of the legis-
lative history behind section 10(j) requires knowledge of the judicial
treatment of labor injunctions in the periods leading up to section 10(j)'s
adoption. This judicial history can be divided into three major stages: (1)
excessive repression of union activities (pre-1932), (2) excessive indulgence
of union activities (1932-1947), and (3) attempted balance between repres-
sion and indulgence (post-1947).9 7 Much of the change in the judicial
treatment of labor injunctions over time can be attributed to Congress,
which has passed four distinct acts altering the jurisdiction and standard
93. Juan Alberto Arteaga, Note, Juvenile (In)Justice: Congressional Attempts to Abro-
gate the Procedural Rights of Juvenile Defendants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1051, 1087 n.199
(2002) ("Allowing courts to make public policy decisions precludes the ability of the citizenry
to hold its government accountable because Article III of the Constitution grants federal judg-
es life tenure during good behavior ...."'); see also Tory A. Weigand, Lost Chances, Felt
Necessities, and the Tale of Two Cities, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 327, 332 (2010) ("Judges and
the case-specific adjudicatory system are poorly designed for broad policymaking.").
94. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
95. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982)
("[Tlhese [life tenure and compensation] provisions were incorporated into the Constitution to
ensure the independence of the Judiciary from the control of the Executive and Legislative
Branches of government").
96. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 704 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[Tlhe Framers of the Constitution believed that those [life tenure and compensation] protec-
tions were necessary in order to guarantee that the judicial power of the United States would
be placed in a body of judges insulated from majoritarian pressures ....").
97. See Fahrenkopf, supra note 8, at 1161-67 (summarizing these three stages and
quoting Justice Frankfurter's view that section 10(j) was the result of Congress seeking "the
appropriate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to
further their respective interests" (quoting Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of
Am. v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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requirements for labor injunctions.98 These acts distinguished labor injunc-
tions from general injunctions and culminated with the unique mandate in
section 10(j). 99 The historical judicial excess that led to the necessity of sec-
tion 10(j) reinforces the conclusion that it is truer to congressional intent for
courts to apply the remedial purpose approach rather than the traditional
equitable principles approach.
A. Pre-1932
Labor injunctions were initially treated the same as ordinary preliminary
injunctions in that courts would use the equitable principles approach to
determine the merit of granting an injunction.' ° Under that approach, courts
are afforded considerable leeway in weighing the relative importance of
each prong.1° 1 In the early twentieth century, courts used this flexibility to
repress the organization of workers. 102 Courts of this period were "unneces-
sarily unsympathetic to the labor movement" and used injunctions to enjoin
union activities regardless of their circumstances.10 3
Congress attempted to remedy this problem by explicitly distinguishing
labor injunctions from ordinary injunctions. In section 20 of the Clayton
Act,"° Congress provided that, except to avoid irreparable injury, courts
could not use injunctions to prevent labor unions from carrying out lawful
union activity, which included strikes, picketing, and boycotts.'05 However,
this provision was ineffective at preventing the judicial misuse of labor in-
junctions. One reason for this ineffectiveness was that courts used a
definition of "irreparable injury" that could not have been intended by Con-
gress. Courts considered any interference with business or trade an
98. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, sec. 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (2006)); Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-113); National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169); Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144).
99. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Lapp, supra note 7, at 254 (explaining that during this time period, with
little statutory guidance in regard to labor injunctions, "the courts relied on existing rules of
equity"). The use of the equitable principles is the most common standard for preliminary
injunctions as the result of "several hundred years of history." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321, 329 (1944). However, other standards may be prescribed by federal statute. See Wein-
berger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) ("Congress may intervene and guide or
control the exercise of the courts' discretion .... "). The prongs of the traditional equitable
principles approach are listed supra note 11 and accompanying text.
101. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.11(2) (2d ed. 1993).
102. See Fahrenkopf, supra note 8, at 1161-62; Schatzki, supra note 57, at 565-67 (ar-
guing that courts during this time were "unnecessarily unsympathetic to the labor
movement").
103. Schatzki, supra note 57, at 567.
104. Ch. 323, sec. 20, 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2006)).
105. See 29 U.S.C. § 52; see also Dylan M. Carson, Note, The Browning of Sports Law:
Defining the Survival of the Labor Exemption after the Expiration of Bargaining Agreements,
30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1141, 1150-51 (1997) (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 52).
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irreparable injury. 106 This definition allowed courts to enjoin labor unions on
strike regardless of the particular facts of the situation, despite Congress's
stated intent to allow lawful union strikes. 10 7 Section 20 was also ineffective
because courts narrowly construed it. The Supreme Court limited the appli-
cation of section 20's exemption to only those employees directly affected
by the terms or conditions of employment at issue. 108 In essence, this inter-
pretation meant that courts were free to issue injunctions against peaceful
secondary boycotts. 109 Other court interpretations limited the exemption
only to situations where the purpose of the strike was the immediate better-
ment of working conditions."0 Ultimately, there remained a deep concern
that courts were resolving labor disputes without ever seriously addressing
the merits of the dispute."'
B. 1932-1947
Recognizing the Clayton Act's failure to limit injunctions against labor
unions,I12 Congress further distinguished labor injunctions through the pas-
sage of two pro-labor acts: the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932" 3 and the
NLRA of 1935."1 The Norris-LaGuardia Act partially removed judicial ju-
risdiction over labor injunctions, stating that "[n]o Court of the United
States ... shall have jurisdiction to issue any ... temporary or permanent
injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute" without
satisfying strict requirements.' Additionally, the NLRA enhanced adminis-
106. See Helen V. Davis, Comment, Clayton Act: Injunctions in Labor Disputes, 8 CAL.
L. REV. 174, 177 (1920) (citing Washingtonian Home of Chi. v. City of Chicago, 117 N.E. 737
(1917), and Parkinson Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 98 P. 1027 (1908)) (noting that the loss
occurring from a strike could not "be measured by any pecuniary standard").
107. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 472 (1921) (declining
to extend section 20 "beyond the parties affected in a proximate and substantial ... sense").
109. See id. (declining to extend section 20 to cover "merely a sentimental or sympathet-
ic" strike). However, Deering left union activity against an employee's direct employer
protected by the Clayton Act. See id.
110. See Felix Frankfurter & Nathan Greene, Legislation Affecting Labor Injunctions, 38
YALE L.J. 879, 906 (1929) (explaining that this limited interpretation meant that an attempt to
unionize a factory or to refuse to work on nonunion products would not be sheltered by the
Clayton Act). One district court even held that the Clayton Act did not change preexisting law.
See Stephens v. Ohio State Tel. Co., 240 F. 759 (N.D. Ohio 1917).
111. See Schatzki, supra note 57, at 567.
112. It is also possible that Congress recognized that "judges were ill equipped to pass
judgment upon the social and economic issues involved in labor disputes." Fahrenkopf, supra
note 8, at 1162 (quoting STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: LABOR ORGANIZATION
162 (Robert F. Koretz ed., 1970)).
113. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-113 (2006)).
114. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has interpreted these statutory requirements
as prohibiting courts from issuing a labor injunction unless the following conditions
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trative jurisdiction"l6 by creating the Board to govern collective relations
between unions and management in the private sector."I7
Although there were fears that the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA
would be " 'construed' [by courts] into ineffectiveness as was § 20 of the
Clayton Act before it'"I" these concerns were unfounded." 9 In New Negro
Alliance, Justice Roberts wrote that "[t]he legislative history of the [Norris-
LaGuardia] Act demonstrates that it was the purpose of the Congress further
to extend the prohibitions of the Clayton Act respecting the exercise of ju-
risdiction by federal courts and to obviate the results of the judicial
construction of that [Clayton] Act."'2 ° However, this legislation was perhaps
too effective and unintentionally resulted in courts becoming too indulgent
with labor unions.' 2' During this time period, the judiciary became unwill-
ing to impose injunctions against labor unions regardless of the nature of
their activities. 122
were satisfied:
[U]pon findings of fact to the effect (a) that unlawful acts have been threatened and will
be committed unless restrained, or have been committed and will be continued, unless
restrained, and then only against the person or persons, association or organization mak-
ing the threat or permitting the unlawful act or authorizing or ratifying it; (b) that
substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow; (c) that, as to
each item of relief granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon the complainant by deni-
al of the relief than will be inflicted on the defendant by granting it; (d) that complainant
has no adequate remedy at law; and (e) that the public officers charged with the duty to
protect complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
116. See Ahmed A. White, The Depression Era Sit-Down Strikes and the Limits of Lib-
eral Labor Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 69 (2010) ("[T]he Wagner Act undertook to
regulate labor relations by the positive assertion of administrative jurisdiction ....").
117. Patrick Morvan, A Comparison of the Freedom of Speech of Workers in French and
American Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1015, 1027 (2009) ("The National Labor Relations Act. .. gov-
ems collective relations between unions and management in the private sector.").
118. See Erwin B. Ellmann, Comment, Labor Law-When a "Labor Dispute" Exists
Within Meaning of the Norris-La Guardia Act, MICH. L. REV. 1146, 1147 (1938).
119. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
120. New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 562 (footnotes omitted).
121. See Fahrenkopf, supra note 8, at 1163 (citing STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES: LABOR ORGANIZATION 548-49 (Robert F. Koretz ed., 1970)) (noting that during the
period of time between the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act many people believed that the judiciary had become too indulgent with labor
unions).
122. See id. (noting that judicial decisions during this time period "revealed an unwill-
ingness to impose restrictions on labor union activity" despite union abuses such as




Congress's response was to pass the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,123 amend-
ing the NLRA. Calling the existing laws "inadequa[te]," the Senate report
explained as follows:
The need for such legislation is urgent. Supreme Court interpretations of
the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-injunction Act and the Clayton Act seem to
have placed union activities, no matter how destructive to the rights of the
individual workers and employers who are conforming to the National La-
bor Relations Act, beyond the pale of Federal law. Moreover, the
administration of the National Labor Relations Act itself has tended to de-
stroy the equality of bargaining power necessary to maintain industrial
peace.2 4
One of the Senate's expressed goals was to include amendments that would
"equalize legal responsibilities of labor organizations and employers."' 5
Included in these amendments were sections 10(j) and (1).126 Section 10()
governs specific, enumerated alleged unfair labor practices by unions; 127 sec-
tion 10(j) governs all other alleged unfair labor practices by both unions and
employers."l 8
Under section 10(j), federal courts regained full jurisdiction to adjudicate
labor disputes, but this jurisdiction was contingent upon the Board petitioning
for relief on behalf of an aggrieved party who had filed a complaint with
it. 129 This contingency meant that courts could not issue injunctive relief for
an unfair labor practice unless the Board was the party bringing the suit,
123. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
124. S. REP. No. 80-105, at 2 (1947), reprinted in I U.S. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407-08
(1948).
125. Id. at 407.
126. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (1) (2006).
127. See § 160() (noting that its scope is restricted to "unfair labor practice[s] within the
meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B), or (C) of section 158(b) of this title, or section 158(e) of
this title or 158(b)(7) of this title," all of which refer only to unfair labor practices by labor
organizations).
128. See § 1600) (providing no restrictions on its scope, stating that it applies whenever
there is a charge that "any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice").
However, today section 10(j) is primarily used only against employers. Lapp, supra note 7, at
264 n.62 ("[Tioday nearly every section 100) injunction is filed against an employer."). Courts
apply the same standard to both sections 10(j) and 10(). E.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bair,
957 E2d 599, 603 n.4 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter ex rel.
NLRB, 385 F.2d 265, 269 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1967)) ("[Tlhe standards applied under sections
10(j) and 10(l) are the same."); Gottfried ex rel. NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n,
Local Union No. 80, 927 F.2d 926, 927 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Levine ex rel. NLRB v. C & W
Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 1979)) ("[T]he same standards apply under §§ 10(j)
and 10(l).").
129. See § 1600). Section 10(1) also returns full jurisdiction to the federal courts and
makes relief contingent upon the Board petitioning for relief on behalf of an aggrieved party.
See § 160().
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enabling the Board to provide a buffer from an overreaching judiciary.13°
Additionally, it allowed the Board to preserve its remedial powers despite its
slow adjudication process."' This consideration was important for Con-
gress. 1
32
Despite the existence of the equitable principles approach, after the
passage of section 10(j) courts initially defined "just and proper" to re-
quire deference to the Board's administrative judgment in determining the
propriety of section 10(j) relief.133 Rather than using the equitable princi-
ples approach, courts tended to grant relief as long as the Board
demonstrated that its request was not insubstantial or frivolous. 13 4 Between
1947 and the 1960s, "[i]n obedience to [the objectives of the NLRA] and
similar intent of Congress and the desire to effectuate a statutory policy, the
courts.., consistently held that the grant of the injunction depend[ed] upon
the standards set forth in the statute and not upon traditional equity crite-
ria."' 35 Such early judicial interpretation of congressional intent is
130. See Lapp, supra note 7, at 259 ("[Tlhe Board would provide a buffer from an over-
reaching judiciary by picking and choosing the cases a district court could adjudicate.").
131. See Pring, supra note 13, at 304 ("The legislative history of section 10(j) demon-
strates that the section was passed to protect the Board's limited remedial powers."); Saltzman
& Salazar-Hobson, supra note 15, at 234-35 ("[Section 10(j)] vested federal courts with lim-
ited injunctive authority to assure the effective enforcement of Board remedies for unfair labor
practices.").
132. A Senate report explained as follows:
Time is usually of the essence in these matters, and consequently the relatively slow pro-
cedure of Board hearing and order, followed many months later by an enforcing decree
of the circuit court of appeals, falls short of achieving the desired objectives .... Hence
we have provided that the Board, acting in the public interest and not in vindication of
purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief in the case of all types of unfair labor
practices ....
S. REP. No. 80-105, at 8 (1947), reprinted in 1 U.S. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 414 (1948).
133. Fahrenkopf, supra note 8, at 1171 (noting that until the 1960s courts "tended to
defer to administrative judgment on the question of the propriety of section 10j) relief").
134. See Fusco ex rel. NLRB v. Richard W. Kaase Baking Co., 205 E Supp. 465, 476
(N.D. Ohio 1962) ("[T]he Court need find only that the Regional Director of the National
Labor Relations Board had reasonable cause to authorize the issuance of a complaint and that
the relief sought is appropriate."); Jaffee ex rel. NLRB v. Henry Heide, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 52,
57 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ("Accordingly, the issue here is only whether on the evidence presented
the Board could reasonably find that Heide committed [the] unfair labor practices alleged.").
135. Douds ex rel. NLRB v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 474, 477 (D.N.J. 1951);
accord Lebus ex rel. NLRB v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 702, 705 (W.D.
La. 1963) ("The Court is cognizant that the injunctive relief here sought is for the protection
of the public interest and in aid of a policy which Congress has made plain. For this reason,
the area for the exercise of the traditional discretion not to grant an injunction is much more
limited." (citations omitted)); Henry Heide, 115 F. Supp. at 57 (deferentially reviewing the
Board's decision); Douds ex rel. NLRB v. Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 75 F Supp. 414,
418 (N.D.N.Y. 1947) ("The relief provided [under section 10(j)] is entirely statutory. The
common law requirements do not apply. The statutory scheme is complete in itself. 'As the
issuance of an injunction in cases of this nature has statutory sanction, it is of no moment that
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considered appropriate evidence of congressional intent with regard to statu-
tory standards to be applied. 36
It was not until the 1960s that courts started construing the just and
proper standard to mean more than a merely nonfrivolous claim.13 7 Courts in
this decade were the first to treat section 10(j) relief as an extraordinary
remedy and the first to turn to the equitable principles approach. 13 8 However,
many circuits continued to apply the deferential remedial purpose ap-
proach.'39
D. Striking a Balance
A narrow view of this history supports the claim of proponents of the
equitable principles approach that section 10(j) was passed to curtail labor
power. Indeed, the Taft-Hartley amendments were necessary only because of
the judiciary's overindulgence of labor union activities under both the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA 4 ° However, this argument fails to
consider why the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA were passed origi-
nally. As demonstrated above, these two acts were designed to prevent
courts from overcurtailing labor power.14' Thus, though section 10(j) was
certainly meant to curtail labor power to some extent, it did not intend a re-
turn to the status quo that existed before the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
NLRA.
The conclusion that Congress intended section 10(j) to strike a balance
between the pre-1930s overinvolvement and post-1930s underinvolvement
of courts is supported by the report of the Senate committee that proposed
the bill.' 42 While acknowledging the need to avoid the then-existing state of
court underinvolvement under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA, 14
3
the plaintiff has failed to show threatened irreparable injury or the like ....' (quoting SEC v.
Torr, 87 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1937))).
136. See generally Mary Van Vort, Note, Controlling and Deterring Frivolous In Forma
Pauperis Complaints, 55 FORDHAm L. REV. 1165, 1175-77 (1987) (arguing that pre-filing
dismissal of in forma pauperis applications is supported by early judicial interpretation of
congressional intent).
137. Fahrenkopf, supra note 8, at 1171 (noting that in the 1960s the courts "reinvig-
orat[ed] the just and proper requirement to demand more than a mere non-frivolous claim").
138. See McLeod ex rel. NLRB v. Gen. Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847, 849 (2d Cir. 1966)
("[T]he issuance of [a section 10(j)] injunction is an extraordinary remedy indeed."). This case
is the earliest case recorded on Westlaw that advocates for the use of the equitable principles.
139. See, e.g., NLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 389 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1967); Angle v. Sacks ex
rel. NLRB, 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967).
140. See supra Sections III.B-C.
141. See supra Section HB.
142. S. REP. No. 80-105, reprinted in 1 U.S. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407-08 (1948).
143. Id. at 408 (noting the "inadequacy of existing laws on industrial relations" and the
fact that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act "placed union activi-
ties, no matter how destructive to the rights of the individual workers and employers ...
beyond the pale of federal law").
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the committee's report also emphasized the need to avoid the overinvolve-
ment of pre-1932 courts.44 The report explained that it did "not believe that
social gains which industrial employees have received by reason of [the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA] should be impaired in any degree.'' 45
This language is evidence that Congress intended judicial restraint to avoid
the judicial excess of the pre-1930s.
This conclusion is further supported by the three acts that preceded sec-
tion 10(j)'s enactment. All three acts were designed to achieve the
aforementioned "social gains" by limiting the judiciary's power in the
context of labor disputes. 14 6 With the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts,
Congress sought to expand labor power by limiting judicial jurisdiction to
grant injunctive relief against union activity. 141 Similarly, Congress sought to
expand labor power by creating an administrative agency, the Board, to gov-
ern collective relations between employers and employees instead of the
courts. 48 To return to the same approach that did not result in judicial re-
straint before the 1930s contravenes Congress's desire to preserve the social
gains these acts achieved.
Thus, the argument that section 10(j) was intended to curtail labor pow-
er, while technically correct, is misleading. Congress intended section 10(j)
to curtail labor power while simultaneously promoting judicial restraint.
Unlike the equitable principles approach, the remedial purpose approach
achieves both of these intentions. It preserves the necessary curtailing of
labor power by returning jurisdiction to the courts yet also achieves judicial
restraint by giving the courts less power than they had pre-1932. In contrast,
the equitable principles approach would return the courts to the same ap-
proach they abused before the 1930s. Therefore, legislative history supports
the remedial purpose approach to labor injunctions as the best reflection of
congressional intent.
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE COURTS UNDER THE
REMEDIAL PURPOSE APPROACH
While returning to section 100)'s structural and historical context re-
veals the remedial purpose approach as more representative of congressional
intent than the traditional equitable principles approach, returning to this
context fails to address a common concern: the courts' role, or lack thereof,
under such a deferential approach. Critics fear that the remedial purpose
approach removes courts from the section 10(j) process altogether, allowing
144. Id. at 407 (implying that the existing laws before 1932 had allowed courts to keep
"labor organizations ... relatively weak and ineffective" and emphasizing the positive nature
of the social gains that industrial workers were able to achieve after the Norris-LaGuardia Act
of 1932).
145. Id. at 407.
146. See supra Sections III.A-B.
147. See supra Sections III.A-B.
148. See supra Section III.B.
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Board bias to unfairly influence injunction decisions.49 This concern is un-
warranted. As demonstrated by the circuits currently following this
approach, courts continue to play an important role in the section 10(j) pro-
cess under the remedial purpose approach, and the level of deference
required does not prevent courts from effectively safeguarding against Board
bias.
Numerous courts have expressed the concern that the remedial purpose
approach will lead to courts serving as a "rubber stamp" for the Board. 150
However, this concern ignores the important role that courts have played in
circuits that already apply this approach. 15' Courts are able to use their pow-
er of judicial review to ensure that the Board is acting within its legislatively
delegated authority.5 2
While courts applying the remedial purpose approach have not spelled
out the level of deference to apply, there is textual support for the use of the
"substantial evidence" level of deference. Courts adjudicating petitions filed
under sections 10(e) and (f)-which have the same just and proper standard
as section 10(j)-use this level of deference.'53 Because of the parallel struc-
ture of these three NLRA sections, it follows that courts adjudicating a
section 10(j) petition should use the same level of deference as courts adju-
dicating a petition under sections 10(e) or (f).
Under the substantial-evidence level of deference, a court must defer to
the Board when the Board's findings are supported by substantial
149. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
150. Maram ex rel. NLRB v. Universidad Interamericana de P.R., Inc., 722 F.2d 953,958
(1st Cir. 1983) ("[Tlhe whole panoply of discretionary issues with respect to granting prelimi-
nary relief must be addressed by the court [lest the court become] a 'rubber stamp' for the
Director."); accord Pye ex rel. NLRB v. Teamsters Local Union No. 122, 875 F. Supp. 921,
928 (D. Mass. 1995); Rivera-Vega ex rel. NLRB v. ConAgra, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 1350, 1356
(D.P.R. 1995). Many other courts have also addressed this concern in regard to the parallel
situations presented by section 10(/) petitions. See, e.g., Danielson ex rel. NLRB v. Joint Bd.
of Coat, Suit, & Allied Garment Workers' Union, 494 F.2d 1230, 1239 (2d Cir. 1974); Solien
ex rel. NLRB v. Miscellaneous Drivers Union, 440 F.2d 124, 131 (8th Cir. 1971); Retail
Clerks Union Local 137 v. Food Emp'rs Council, Inc., 351 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1965).
151. Courts have not been a rubber stamp for the Board in the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits, which currently apply the remedial purpose approach. In the past ten
years, district courts within these circuits have denied section 10(j) injunctive relief in four out
of fifteen cases. See Glasser ex rel. NLRB v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 1:09-CV-223, 2009
WL 1383291 (W.D. Mich. May 14, 2009), rev'd, 379 F. App'x 483 (6th Cir. 2010); Kendellen
v. Interstate Waste Servs., No. 06-5694(SRC), 2007 WL 121435 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2007);
Calatrello v. Am. Church, Inc., No. 1:05 CV 797, 2005 WL 1389042 (N.D. Ohio June 9,
2005); Johnson ex rel. NLRB v. Sunshine Piping, Inc., 238 E Supp. 2d 1297 (N.D. Fla. 2002).
Glasser was the only one of these cases overruled by an appellate court.
152. See generally Carl T. Bogus, The Battle for Separation of Powers in Rhode Island,
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 114 (2004) ("The courts have the power of judicial review to ensure
that the agency is acting within its legislatively-delegated authority, following legislatively-
prescribed procedures, and not acting arbitrarily or capriciously .... ").
153. See, e.g., Beth Isr. Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978) (applying the substan-
tial-evidence level of deference to a section 10(e) petition); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (applying the substantial-evidence level of deference to a section
10(f) petition).
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evidence.14 While following the remedial purpose approach and using the
substantial-evidence level of deference may provide an easier burden of
proof for the Board than under the equitable principles approach, a court
still has the authority to determine whether that burden is met. Moreover,
even if a court feels compelled to issue injunctive relief because of the def-
erential nature of the approach, if it, "in its discretion, does not believe that
far-reaching mandatory relief would serve the purposes of the Act, it need
not grant the full remedy requested by the Board" and may instead issue
only a partial injunction.1 55
This judicial review is especially important since the Board has not been
immune to bias. Shortly after its creation, the Board demonstrated a pro-
labor bias. 5 6 Even today, there is evidence that the Board's ideology reflects
the ideology of the administration that appointed its members. 5 7 Under the
substantial-evidence level of deference, courts are free to deny section 10(j)
relief when they believe it is not supported by the evidence and instead driv-
en by bias.'58 Thus, the court's role under the remedial purpose approach is
not insignificant.
CONCLUSION
In view of the likely increase in the number of section 10(j) petitions for
injunctive relief following the NLRA general counsel's memorandum, the
judicial interpretations of the just and proper standard merit renewed con-
sideration. Focusing on section 10(j)'s structural and historical context
reveals that the remedial purpose approach is a better representation of Con-
gress's intent than the equitable principles approach. First, the fact that
section 10(j) is parallel in structure to sections 10(e) and (f) provides evi-
dence of congressional intent to avoid the use of the equitable principles
approach and to use instead a deferential approach. Second, the fact that
154. NLRB v. Auciello Iron Works, Inc., 980 F.2d 804, 807 (1st Cir. 1992) ("A court
must enforce the Board's order if the Board correctly applied the law and if its findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence on the administrative record viewed as a whole."). Ac-
cording to Universal Camera, "substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion'" 340 U.S. at 477 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir.
1975).
156. See HUGH DAvIs GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 130-31 (1st ed. 1990) (discuss-
ing the "pro-labor prejudice" of the early NLRB); see also Fisk & Malamud, supra note 4, at
2035 (referring to the "perceived NLRB pro-union bias").
157. See Terry M. Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the
NLRB, 79 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 1094, 1102 (1985) ("[C]hange in presidential administration
from Republican to Democrat gives rise to a pro-labor shift in NLRB performance, and a
change from Democrat to Republican produces a pro-business shift."); William N. Cooke &
Frederick H. Gautschi III, Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REv. 539 (1982) (describing a correlation between Board voting behavior and the
ideology of the administration that appointed Board members).
158. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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section 10(j) includes a congressional mandate supports the use of the re-
medial purpose approach, given the Board's labor relations expertise and its
accountability to the public. Third, section 10(j)'s legislative history reveals
a congressional intent to impose judicial restraint. Each of these three pieces
of evidence on its own would be insufficient to establish a "necessary and
inescapable inference" that Congress intended courts to apply the remedial
purpose approach rather than the traditional equitable principles approach.
However, when considered together, this evidence about section 10(j)'s
structure, underlying policy, and history is more than enough to find such an
inference.
